NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5 by Gur Ofer
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, editors
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-02312-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan90-1
Conference Date: March 9-10, 1990
Publication Date: January 1990
Chapter Title: Macroeconomic Issues of Soviet Reforms
Chapter Author: Gur Ofer
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10977
Chapter pages in book: (p. 297 - 342)Gur  Ofer 
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Macroeconomic Issues  of  Soviet  Reforms* 
1. Introduction 
Five years into the "Gorbachev era," economic reforms appear to be enter- 
ing  a period  of  retrenchment,  if not  actual retreat. This is probably a 
response  to the disarray prevailing in the Soviet economy in recent years, 
which  ensued  when  the  steps  taken  toward  "marketization" not  only 
failed to deliver the expected results but were even charged with responsi- 
bility for the crisis. The main features of this crisis are, on the supply side, 
the failure to increase production  (especially of consumer goods) and, on 
the demand  side,  the creation of excess  demand  through increased gov- 
ernment budget deficits and other sources of income and monetary expan- 
sion. So far, only part of the resulting disequilibrium has been reflected in 
open inflation, at estimated recent annual rates of between 7-11% or more 
(see  Peel  1989; PlanEcon Report, November  24,  1989, p.  7). Most of the 
disequilibrium takes the form of repressed inflation and consequent  mar- 
ket shortages.  A so-called overhang  of monetary assets has accumulated 
in the hands of households  and enterprises,  most of it recently. In view of 
the above-mentioned  developments,  this overhang is often considered an 
immanent  threat  of  further  economic  deterioration  (see,  for example, 
Ryzhkov  1989b). 
The disappointing  results  to date have  led to widespread  disillusion 
with  the  prospects  of  the  reforms  and  has  eroded  their popular  and 
professional  appeal.  They  also  fomented  some  antagonism  toward  the 
embryonic  legal  private  (cooperative)  sector. With excess  monetary  in- 
comes  and  balances  on  the  demand  side,  and  difficulties  in obtaining 
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supplies  at official prices,  prices in the very narrow private sector shot 
up; private operators were  branded  "speculators" (one of the worst ex- 
pletives  in the  Russian  and  Soviet  lexicons),  forcing  the  authorities  to 
impose  restrictions and controls that held back the potential contribution 
of a private sector. 
Three major policy choices  now  face the Soviet leadership: (1) leaping 
headfirst into  the turbulent  waters  of radical reforms (in the hope  that 
this  will  both  restore  stability  and  increase  consumer  welfare),  (2) at- 
tempting a frontal assault on the stabilization problem and the shortages 
of consumer  goods  (separately  from other reform issues),  and  (3) em- 
barking on a longer-term,  more thorough  process of preparing the infra- 
structure for marketization and "privatization" reforms. One illustration 
of this dilemma  is the choice between,  on the one hand,  a radical price 
reform-near  complete  price  liberalization  (emulating  Poland)-which 
could  serve  as  a major means  of achieving  stabilization  and  a proper 
supply  response,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  postponement  of  price 
liberalization  until  after the  successful  implementation  of  a fiscal and 
monetary stabilization program. 
The  Soviet  leadership  seems  to  have  opted  for the  latter strategy- 
conservative,  even  "revisionist"  policies  are used  to achieve  stabiliza- 
tion  and  increase  the  supply  of  consumer  goods,  while  a program of 
reform is  being  prepared.  Last September,  Leonid  Abalkin  (a leading 
economist  and  now  head  of  the  government  committee  on  economic 
reform and vice-chairman  of the Council of Ministers) called for a new 
start toward  orderly  and  gradual  reform over  a period  of at least  ten 
years  (Abalkin  1989a).  The  first  phase  of  the  reform  is  essentially  a 
macrostabilization  program,  designed  largely  to  correct many  of  the 
mistakes  of partial reforms since  1985, and proposed  to create a sound 
macroeconomic  financial  infrastructure  for  future  reforms.  Even  this 
modest  program  met  with  substantial  opposition;  it  was  eventually 
replaced  by  a  more  conservative  program  presented  last  December 
by  Nikolai  Ryzhkov,  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (Ryzhkov 
1989b).  Ryzhkov's  plan  (which  is  now  being  implemented)  concen- 
trates on the achievement  of restoration of macroeconomic  equilibrium 
via three main efforts.  The first is to rebalance the state budget,  mostly 
using  traditional  fiscal  instruments  and  taxes.  The combination  of re- 
form steps  and  policies  since  1985 created a dangerous  budget  deficit 
that was  partly responsible  for the macrodisequilibrium  and most  mar- 
ket shortages  in recent years. 
The  second  effort  is  directed  at  tightening  the  (somewhat  relaxed) 
central control over previously  delegated,  though  limited, authority-to 
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banks with  respect  to credit. The main goal of this effort is to limit the 
flow  of nonbudgetary  monetary  resources  to the economy,  a flow  that 
has also contributed  to inflationary pressures  in recent years. 
The third effort seeks  to restore equilibrium in the consumer  markets 
on  the  supply  side  through  the  reallocation  of resources  from invest- 
ment  and  defense  to increased  production  of consumer  goods.  While 
focusing  on resource  reallocation  is an innovation  (it is a major shift in 
the  objective  function  of  the  leadership),  the  proposed  means  to  be 
used  are  the  familiar  ones  of  central  physical  planning  and  control. 
Unlike the recent tendency  to release enterprises  from the obligation to 
fulfill  central  production  orders  ("State  orders")  and  divert  an  in- 
creasing  proportion  of  their production  capacity to free markets,  such 
orders,  often  covering  the  entire  production  volume,  are now  being 
reintroduced.  Both Abalkin's and Ryzhkov's  proposals,  and indeed  pre- 
vious  schemes  as  well,  postpone  the  long-awaited  price  reform for a 
number of years. 
Oscillations  of one  kind  or another in the reform process  should  not 
come as a surprise.  But they do present  an opportunity, if one needs  an 
excuse,  to reassess  the reform process,  review  and analyze  some  of its 
basic present  and  past  problems,  and  evaluate  options  for the  future. 
This paper concentrates  on macroeconomic  aspects  of the reforms with 
reference to their microeconomic  foundations.  On the real side of macro- 
economics,  this  paper  ignores  the  underlying  reasons  for the reforms, 
namely  the  exhaustion  of  growth  potential  and  the  disappearance  of 
productivity  growth under the old economic  regime with its "extensive" 
growth  strategy. Basic indicators of past growth and the structure of the 
economy  appear in Appendix  Table Al  (parts a-c).  Section 2 discusses 
the legacy of supply  of real resources and its structural allocation on the 
eve  of the  reforms,  the  constraints  it imposes  and  the  opportunities  it 
offers. Most of this paper deals with problems related to the absence and 
creation of appropriate fiscal and monetary institutions  and instruments 
in  the  transition  from  the  old,  centrally  planned  system  to  a  more 
market-oriented  one.  We examine  the recent introduction  of new  micro- 
and  macroeconomic  instruments  and  their  effect  on  production  and 
macroeconomic  equilibrium. 
Some facets of macroeconomic  problems in a Soviet setting  go far be- 
yond those found  in ordinary mixed-market economies.  First, the Soviet 
economy  lacks many institutional  tools and infrastructural elements  that 
make up a fiscal and monetary  system.  The state budget  is unfamiliar to 
Western  eyes;  for years  the  production  sector  was  excluded  from the 
monetary system-now  it must be incorporated into it; there is no credit 
system in the market-economy  sense  of the term, and no legislation  per- 300 *  OFER 
taining  to market operations;  one  cannot  even  find any acceptable and 
consistent  lexicon of terms to be used in this new environment; and there 
is very limited knowledge  of (and even less experience in) economics and 
business.  Furthermore,  there are no traditional patterns of government 
action in these spheres  that can serve as a benchmark for assessing  credi- 
bility or a record upon  which  to form expectations. 
Next,  we  encounter  strongly  entrenched  traditions geared to the old 
system.  Suffice it to note  the emphasis  on quantity  targets rather than 
profits,  the hothouse  environment  of the "soft budget  constraint," and 
the  unwillingness  to  take risks.  Constraints  on  private and  enterprise 
holdings  of assets,  the low-interest  rate, other structural factors affecting 
the savings  function  and the demand  for money  are all about to change 
radically. The change  may prompt  equally radical changes  in the shape 
of these  functions,  and consequently  in the basic building blocks of the 
new  macroeconomic  regime. 
The main  policy  emphasis  has  lately been  on  problems  of transition 
and disequilibrium  associated  with the topics listed above.  But the main 
structure envisioned  for the Soviet economic  model of the future and the 
time  frame  for its  implementation  are yet  to  be  determined.  This in- 
cludes,  inter alia, the extent of the market domain,  the nature and struc- 
ture of  property  ownership  and  rights,  the  character of future  capital 
markets,  and the  system  of external economic  relations.  In the absence 
of a clearly defined  target, households  and enterprises  are understand- 
ably skeptical about the likely efficiency of instruments  and policies. 
Taking some of the above problems into account, the discussion  of past 
macroeconomic  developments  and  policies,  and  of present  and  future 
options,  will proceed  as follows:  Section  2 presents  a discussion  of the 
consequences  of past "extensive" growth strategy that exerted great pres- 
sure on inputs and resources in order to catch up with the West. In Section 
3 we  analyze  options  for fiscal and budgetary  policies.1 Section 4 is de- 
voted  to macro-  and  related  microeconomic  aspects  of the  production 
sector-its  monetization  and the decentralization  of enterprise  decision 
making, and an analysis of the new decentralized credit system.  Section 5 
deals mainly with liquidity problems of the household  sector-problems 
of flows  and stocks (the overhang)  with emphasis  on the analysis of the 
changes  in demand  functions  for wealth  and savings,  and for money. In 
the  concluding  section  the  pieces  are put  together  in  a framework  of 
general equilibrium and various reform itineraries, and policy options are 
examined.  The relationships  between  a short-term stabilization program 
and long-term reforms are examined by analyzing  similarities and differ- 
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ences between  the Soviet Union and several market economies  in need of 
stabilization programs. 
Three further comments  are warranted. First, the Soviet economy  still 
operates almost entirely with fixed, centrally determined  prices that seri- 
ously  distort relative scarcities. Almost  every step on the way to reform 
suffers from the existence  of such (almost completely  nonflexible) prices. 
The  issue  of  sequencing  a  price  reform  early  on  in  the  reforms  has 
always been on the agenda,  but the present decision is to postpone  it for 
several more years.  As we  shall see,  the timing of the price reform is a 
major element  in the discussion  of most issues. 
Second,  this paper addresses  mainly the "upper" part of the business 
cycle,  that  is  above  full  employment.  The  fact that  the  reforms  may 
generate  unemployment  is widely  recognized,  and tends  to retard their 
progress.  Initially,  such  unemployment  is  mostly  structural; it results 
from a hardening  of the  budget  constraint  on  loss-making  enterprises 
and from moving  personnel  from the bureaucracy into  the production 
sector. 
Finally, this paper neglects  of the role of external economic  relations. 
The extended  "functional" isolation  of the Soviet economy  from world 
markets contributed  to inefficiency,  distortions,  and technological  lags. 
Exposure  may  help  make  the  Soviet  economy  more  efficient  through 
signals  of world  prices,  competition,  the  challenges  of imports  and  of 
exports,  and  a constant  effort  to  make  (and  keep)  the  local  currency 
convertible.  In  the  present  Soviet  situation,  foreign  involvement  can 
help  transform  the  economy  into  a market  system  by  example,  joint 
ventures,  direct investments,  exchange programs, and so on. The exten- 
sion  of  credit  can  assist  both  as  a standby  support  for a stabilization 
program, and as a source for investment  funds.  However,  the sheer size 
of the  Soviet  economy  precludes  massive  assistance  in relative  terms. 
Finally, foreign  currency can also  serve as an important stable asset  for 
firms and households,  and even  as a temporary currency and a vehicle 
of monetary  reform. 
2. Disequilibrium  in the  Real  Sector:  The  Legacy  of the  Past 
The  Soviet  Union  arrived  at  the  starting  post  of  reform in  a  state  of 
exhaustion-which  is  to  say, with  almost  no  potential  reserves  of real 
resources.  Indeed,  it  had  a very  substantial  internal  debt,  not  in  the 
ordinary meaning  of  the  term,  but in the form of a serious  backlog of 
investments  in infrastructure of all kinds,  in modern technology,  and in 
public and social services.  It will be difficult to renew  economic  growth 
without addressing  this backlog. The servicing of this debt has taken the 302  OFER 
form of a declining level of economic efficiency and performance, as 
accumulating bottlenecks imposed  more and  more constraints and 
caused increasing disruptions. These factors, combined with transition 
difficulties, canceled out much of the productivity  gains that were ex- 
pected, at least according to the welcome with which the announced 
changes were received. 
A backlog of needed investments developed despite the fact that un- 
der the "old" regime the share of investment in GNP and the rate of 
growth of capital stock had been exceptionally  high (gross investment 
was about one-third  of GNP,  and the annual growth rate of capital  stock 
was 6-8%; see Appendix Tabled  Al,  part c.). The policy of high invest- 
ment rates is  one  aspect of the so-called extensive growth strategy: 
growth is input-intensive and, as it turned out, weak on technological 
change. The obverse side of this strategy  was the maximization  of labor- 
force  participation.  The labor  contribution  to this strategy,  however, had 
already run its course (sinking to labor-force  growth rates of around 
0.7%  per year). The extensive growth model gradually  came to resemble 
a capital  growth model with increasingly  negative consequences of diffi- 
culties in capital-labor  substitution, causing further declines in capital 
productivity  (see below). 
Extensive  growth can be considered  a key feature  in the Soviet growth 
strategy of catching up with the developed West as rapidly  as possible, 
maximizing  growth rates in the shorter  run at the expense of economic 
potential in the more distant future. This policy of "haste"  can be de- 
fined as one driven by a high rate  of time preference-much higher than 
the rate of return  to investments made in order  to achieve rapid  growth. 
Haste reduces the rate of return  to below what it would have been under 
less intensive pressure on the use of factor of production. Such a high 
time preference  and high internal  future discount rates stand in contrast 
to the traditional  image of a high-investment low-consumption "social- 
ist" growth model. The traditional image, however, is based on the 
assumption that initial high rates of investment reflect a very low time 
preference  in order  to assure higher rates  of consumption  in the (distant) 
future. The haste interpretation  is consistent with a shorter-term  goal of 
maximizing growth with a strong bias in favor of heavy industry and 
defense, rather  than consumption. This, we believe, is a more accurate 
statement of the objective function of the old regime (Ofer, 1987, pp. 
1798-1801;  Berliner  1966). 
The intensive growth model, with its slow improvement  in productiv- 
ity, gravitates  over time toward low growth rates. With "haste"  superim- 
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and  the  investment  potential,2  and  at a much  heavier  cost in terms of 
future growth. 
As for investment,  the haste  doctrine aimed at extremely high  short- 
run output-to-capital  ratios. This was accomplished  by directing most of 
the  available capital to key  elements  of the production  process,  to the 
detriment of auxiliary services and infrastructure, and so on.3 
The pressure  that was brought to bear on both enterprises and minis- 
ters to meet such demanding  production targets, and the virtual absence 
of meaningful  interest charges (0-2% on credits, and a 6% annual charge 
on  the  stock  of fixed  capital of enterprises)  created excess  demand  for 
investment  funds,  which  resulted  in  long  gestation  periods  and  a 
chronic (growing)  stock of unfinished  projects.4 
The relatively  low  innovative  and  technological  content  of Soviet in- 
vestments  can also be interpreted,  at least in part, as a component  of the 
"haste" doctrine.  True, a centrally planned  command-and-control  econ- 
omy creates a systemic (comparative) disadvantage in technological inno- 
vation,  but it is geared to foster short-term quantitative production  and 
to dampen  longer-term  achievement  through  higher R & D activity (at 
the expense  of current production  targets). As a result, the typical profile 
of traditional Soviet investment  reveals a high proportion of construction 
and of vintage  equipment.  A related point is the very low rate at which 
obsolete  equipment  is  discarded,  resulting  in  high  maintenance  costs 
(part of the "interest" payments  on the "debt").5 
All these  created a trend of declining  capital productivity  and declin- 
ing growth  rates of GNP, down  to virtual stagnation  in the early 1980s, 
further diminishing  potential  real reserves.  The gaps  in the infrastruc- 
ture and  the  lagging  technology,  combined  with  the  desire  (under  the 
reform) to reallocate  resources  to the  most  neglected  areas of the  con- 
sumption  sector, led to a difficult dilemma  about the volume  of invest- 
2. Under extensive growth the capital stock is growing faster than output, causing the 
needed investment share of GNP to constantly rise in order to secure a given rate of 
growth of the capital  stock-to  the point of declining absolute  levels of consumption. 
3. The relative neglect of urban and other service-type  investment in infrastructure  was 
also dictated  by the Marxian  doctrinal  bias against  "nonproductive"  investments. 
4. For a discussion of Soviet investment policy problems see Cohn (1976, 1979) and a 
summary  and other references  in Ofer  (1987,  pp. 1805-1809).  On recent  trends  in unfin- 
ished investment projects  see PlanEcon  Report,  September  1, 1989,  pp. 16-21; and No- 
vember  24, 1989, pp. 3-5. The stock of unfinished  investment  may have reached  R180 
billion (almost  20%  of GNP or about 80%  of annual investment  in fixed capital)  by the 
end of 1989,  an increase  of R20-25 billion  over the preceding  year (ibid.). 
5. See a survey discussion in Ofer (1987,  pp. 1817-1819)  and references  there  to Weitzman 
(1979,  1983)  and others. Weitzman  estimated  an elasticity  of substitution  of about  0.4 for 
the 1960s, but the situation has deteriorated  since then. See also Kontorovich  (1985). 304 *  OFER 
ment in the period  of reform. On the one hand,  there was the desire to 
reduce the rate of investment,  both overall and with special emphasis  on 
less-productive  elements,  and  divert  resources  to increased  consump- 
tion.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  an  urgent  need  to  overhaul  the 
infrastructure  and  modernize  the  capital  stock  with  equipment  with 
more advanced  technology.  In the early years of the reform both goals 
were  pursued  simultaneously,  but  little  was  accomplished  on  either 
front (the stock of unfinished  projects, for example, continued  to grow at 
an accelerated rate; see Ryzhkov  1989b). The new  Ryzhkov plan calls for 
an effort to concentrate mostly  on reducing the volume  of investment  to 
free resources  for consumption,  an urgent need  if the reforms are to be 
saved  (more on this below). 
The traditional "socialist" structure of resource allocation, high defense 
and investment  and low consumption  shares, was politically feasible only 
in a totalitarian regime,  and even then, only up to a point. At least part of 
the blame for the decline in growth rates in the prereform era lies with the 
vicious  circle of  declining  growth  rates  of living  standards  and  lower 
quality of public services  (education,  health care, and the welfare state) 
that reduced  work  motivation.  Democratization  in its wide  sense  may 
have been the only way to restore the population's  willingness  to engage 
in  reconstruction.  But democratization  also  depends  on  there being  a 
significant  change  in  the  social  welfare  function-switching  resources 
from defense  and investment  to consumption.  We have already touched 
on some of the problems associated with the a transfer of resources out of 
investment.  Other problems,  to be discussed below, are related to bureau- 
cratic inertia and the decentralization  of the investment  decision process. 
The  transfer  of  resources  out  of  defense  was  based  on  the  "new 
thinking"-the  new  Soviet approach to international relations, the arms 
race, and competition  between  the big powers.  A program of converting 
military production  capacity to civilian uses  started a few years ago, but 
real cuts  in  military  expenditures  and  production  started only  during 
1989. Such conversion  has problems of its own,  at least in the short run, 
among  them  the  need  for technological  modernization.  With roughly 
half of GNP  devoted  to defense  and investment,  and the other half to 
(private and  public)  consumption,  each  percentage  point  reduction  in 
these uses  can increase consumption  by about the same fraction. A long- 
term cut (say, over ten years) in gross investment,  down  to 25% of GNP, 
and in defense  from around  17% to around 8%, can release  15-17% of 
GNP and thereby raise consumption  levels  by up to 1.5% per year. This 
should  be  considered  an  upper  limit,  given  the  policy  dilemmas  and 
difficulties discussed  above. 
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mostly in the 1970s) in the infrastructure of the public services,  housing 
and other urban services,  and social welfare; at the same time, the popu- 
lation is entertaining  rising expectations  that relief from the long period 
of deprivation  in the sphere of private consumption  is in the offing. This 
may be considered  part of the outstanding  real internal debt discussed 
above.  Expectations  of higher  consumption  levels  also  reflect populist 
pronouncements  made in the early stages of democratization-promises 
that will  have  to  kept,  at least  in  part, until  a measure  of  democratic 
responsibility  evolves  to balance unilateral populist-style  demands. 
The real sector of the economy  is, therefore,  under pressure of excess 
"need,"  translated  into  overambitious  annual  production  plans,  which 
impose  heavy  fiscal and monetary burdens.  Attempts  to generate a sup- 
ply response  through  the  decentralization  of decision  making  and  the 
liberalization of various  monetary  and credit instruments  failed to pro- 
duce the desired  results; instead,  they increased  the money  supply  and 
aggravated  the  general  state of disequilibrium.  Pressing  demands,  the 
lack of a fiscal infrastructure,  and inexperience  with the role of budgets 
under  the  new  conditions  joined  to widen  the budget  deficit.  Limited 
steps  have  already  been  taken  to  counteract  monetary  outflows  and 
address the accumulating  monetary  overhang. 
Fiscal  Policies  and  Budgetary  Deficits6 
Table  1  presents  data  on  historical  and  recent  developments  in  the 
Soviet federal budget.  The budget  is "comprehensive"  in the sense  that 
it  covers  all  levels  of  government;  but  it  also  has  some  specific  and 
system-related  peculiarities  that affect different aspects  of its fiscal im- 
pact on the economy.  First, much of the government's  investment  activi- 
ties are not  recorded  in the budget.  Second,  some  budgetary  activities 
in  investment  (both  revenues  and  expenditures)  are  system-specific 
and  result  from  the  role  of  government  as  the  owner  of  most  enter- 
prises.  Finally,  some  (especially  defence-related)  expenditures  are not 
straightforwardly  reported  in  the  budget.  We  discuss  some  of  these 
biases as we go along. 
Not only are the statistics influenced  by the socialist economic  system, 
so are basic concepts,  such as the role of the budget in the economy and its 
impact on it. In addition to the much higher volume of direct intervention 
6. This section is based on Ofer (1990,  Section  3). It draws on CIA  (1988),  PlanEcon  Report, 
various issues, 1988-1989, and articles and speeches by Gostev (1988, 1989), Pavlov 
(1989), Yureyev (1989), Abalkin (1989a),  Ryzhkov (1989a,b)  and others. See also the 
sources  to the tables. Table 1  STATE BUDGET DATA: 1971-1990 
1971-75  1981-85  1  9  8  9  1990 
Original  Revised 
plan  plan  plan  (3)-(2)  (5)-(3)  (5)-(2) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Percent  of GDP 
1  Total expenditures 
2  Investment 
3  Ordinary expenditures 
4  National  economya 
5  Subsidiesb 
6  Social welfare 
7  Defensec 
8  External expenditures 
9  Total revenues 
10  Profit taxes 
11  Above  normal profit taxesd 
12  Turnover taxes 
13  Foreign trade revenues 
14  Taxes on individuals 





























































48.8  3.7  -4.4  -0.7 
5.3  -0.1  -3.4  -3.6 
43.5  3.8  -1.0  2.9 
11.5  -2.0  1.0  -1.0 
12.0  2.0  0.9  2.9 
15.9  1.1  0.5  1.5 
7.1  -0.8  -1.2  -2.0 
2.6  0.8  -0.8  0.1 
42.8  -7.3  2.9  -4.4 
12.3  -2.0  -0.8  -2.8 
1.9  -3.9  -0.8  -4.7 
12.2  -2.9  0.9  -2.0 
5.8  -3.0  -0.7  -3.8 
4.8  0.0  0.5  0.6 
4.0  0.3  0.6  0.9 16  Total deficit 
17  Ordinary deficit 
18  Ordinary deficit  (adj.) 
19  Net taxes on goods  and services 
20  Net taxation 
21  Net taxation  (adj.) 
Billions of current rubles 
22  Total expenditures 
23  Total revenues 
24  Total deficit 
25  GDP 
3.2  2.3 
-7.1  -6.5 
-7.1  0.1 
11.0  14.6 
26.2  30.6 













6.0  11.0  -7.3  3.7 
0.7  11.1  -3.9  7.2 
2.6  7.2  -4.7  2.5 
6.0  -7.8  -0.7  -8.5 
22.5  -9.5  1.4  -8.1 
20.6  -5.6  2.2  -3.4 
186.7  353.0  494.8  481.0  488.2  141.8  -6.6  135.2 
172.6  336.3  371.0  386.8  428.2  34.7  57.2  91.9 
14.0  16.7  123.8  94.1  60.0  107.1  -63.8  43.3 
433.7  712.8  930.0  930.0  1,000.0  217.2  70.0  287.2 
aExcluding expenditures  on investment  and defense. 
bThe figure for 1981-85  is estimated  by applying  the same ratio between  food and total subsidies  as in 1989. 
CThe  figure for defense  in 1981-85  was  estimated  by assuming  real annual growth  of 3% between  1983 and  1989. 
dProfit taxes in excess  of 40% of profits. 
Sources:  Ofer (1990), Appendix  Table 1; 1989 revised  plan (column  4) revised  on the basis of PlanEcon Report, February 21, 1990, p. 13 (based on Ekonomicheskaia 
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in economic  activity, socialist governments  also tend to tilt resource allo- 
cation in favor of public  and  collectively  supplied  goods  and services.7 
In view  of the government's  intensive  involvement  in ordinary invest- 
ment  activity, it makes  sense  to revert to classical definitions  of budget 
deficits. We use three such concepts: the total of fiscal deficit-the  excess 
of  expenditures  of  all kinds  over  ordinary (tax) revenues;  the  ordinary 
deficit,  or the  inverse  of government  savings-the  excess  of ordinary, 
public consumption expenditures  over  ordinary revenues;  and  the  mone- 
tary deficit-the  increase  in monetary  expansion  caused  by the budget 
(this has to do with how  the fiscal deficit is financed).  In addition to the 
ordinary budget  deficit,  I also calculated an adjusted ordinary deficit by 
subtracting part of the profit tax on enterprises  from ordinary revenues. 
The  adjustment  was  performed  because  part of  the  profit tax can be 
regarded  as  dividends  paid  to  the  government  in  its  capacity  as  the 
owner  (a holding  company)  of the enterprises  for investment  purposes. 
A 40% tax on enterprise  profit was  arbitrarily set as the "normal" profit 
tax rate, and all taxes above this rate were excluded  from ordinary reve- 
nues  to calculate the adjusted  ordinary deficit.8 
As for the monetary  deficit,  two comments  are warranted. First, note 
the distinction between  monetary expansion  into the production sector- 
which,  until  the  reforms  were  netitralized  or eliminated  at the  end  of 
every year, and monetary expansion  into the household  or cash sector- 
where it had the regular expansive  effect. Second, the Soviet government 
has so far failed (or did not try) to create long-term financial assets to be 
held by households,  thereby eliminating the option of open market opera- 
tions. The two main financial assets available for the purpose of saving are 
(1) cash and (2) 2-3% (passbook) saving deposits in state banks, which are 
also very liquid.  Thus,  while  any financing of the deficit into the house- 
hold  sector is technically  a monetary  expansion,  its monetary impact is 
not as clear-cut as a monetary expansion  in an ordinary market system if 
people  conceive  of their savings  as long-term  (see Section 5 below). 
The following  three points  summarize  the main budgetary  trends re- 
vealed  in Table 1. First the  relative  size  of the budget  (around  half of 
GNP and much larger than in market economies;  see Blejer and Szapary 
7. This  tendency  is partly  offset by transfer  payments:  at least where wages are  concerned, 
the govenrment, which determines them, can set them as net payments in advance, 
thereby  reducing  the need to collect  personal  income  taxes  and repay  part  of them  in the 
form  of transfers  and reducing  the gap between gross and net taxation. 
8. The "normal"  profit tax rate of 40%  was determined  on the basis of recent actual  U.S. 
rates  (based  on U.S. Department  of Commerce,  1988,  p. 43) and on a declared  target  for 
profit  tax rates in the Soviet Union under the reforms  (Senchagov  1989). Macroeconomic  Issues  of Soviet  Reforms  *  309 
1989) started growing  long  before the reforms (since 1971 to 1975), and 
has  continued  to  grow  under  the  first  five  years  of  the  reform.  The 
revised  plans  for 1989 and  the plans  for 1990 include  the first declared 
intent  to start reducing  the  relative  size  of the budget  (line  1). Budget 
expansion  occurred  despite  declines  in  both  investment  and  defense 
spending.  As expected,  no declining  trend as part of the destatization  of 
the economy  is yet apparent. 
Second,  fiscal deficits before the reform were relatively small (2-3% of 
GNP), but have  expanded  significantly  since then.  The original budget 
presented  for 1989 included  a planned  deficit of 13.3% of GNP (line 16). 
The  emerging  alarm,  once  the  consequences  of  the  recent  monetary 
expansion  were  discerned,  caused  a reverse of policy aimed at reducing 
the  deficit  within  a  number  of  years.  The  revised  deficit  for  1989 is 
around 10%, and for 1990 around 6% of GNP. 
Third, the  prereform  period  was  characterized by a substantial  ordi- 
nary budget surplus, or a more-or-less  balanced adjusted  ordinary budget 
(lines  17,  18).  The  government  financed  budgetary  investments  from 
what we  shall call "above normal" profit taxes.  Since 1985 the ordinary 
deficit grew  by  11 GNP points  and the adjusted  ordinary deficit by 7.2 
points.  The entire increase in the fiscal deficit is credited to the ordinary 
budget,  not  to the  expansion  of investment.  The budget  plan for 1990 
seeks to eliminate  the ordinary deficit almost completely. 
From these  three points  above  we  conclude  that most  of the budget 
deficit was  created  during  the  reform years,  and was  not  carried over 
from the old regime (when an increase in the ordinary budget deficit was 
the main culprit). The development  of the deficit was accompanied by an 
expansion  of the relative size  of the budget,  that is,  increased expendi- 
tures were not followed  by a commensurate  rise in revenues. 
We now  turn to the individual budget elements  that contributed to the 
above developments. 
One of the major reform moves  affecting the budget was the decentral- 
ization  of investment  decisions  and  their financing  sources.  Until 1987 
there  was  no  decline  in  the  level  of investment  financed  by  the  state 
budget  (in terms of percentages  of GNP), compared with the prereform 
period,  which  was  8-9%  (line  2).  Indeed,  only  about  half  of  what  is 
considered  "state centralized investment"  was financed directly through 
the budget,  while  the  other half (the bulk of the depreciation  funds  of 
enterprises) was determined  and redistributed among enterprises by the 
corresponding  ministries.9  For most  practical purposes  this  other  half 
9. Another  part  of the "centralized"  investment  was allocated  through  credit  arrangements 
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should  also  be  included  in the  budget.  Since  1987 this  extrabudgetary 
part of investment  started to be decentralized  and gradually reverted to 
the  enterprises  themselves.  A  similar gradual  process  of relieving  the 
budget  of direct investment  expenditure  started a few years later (Table 
1, line 2). The delay  was  connected  with  the rise in the general level  of 
investments  in  the  first  years  of  the  reforms,  and  the  decline  corre- 
sponds  with  efforts to reduce this level.  According  to the 1989 (revised) 
and 1990 plans,  the share of direct budgetary investment  should  drop to 
around  5% of GNP  (and that of extrabudgetary  centralized  investment 
from 12 to around 8% of GNP). 
The planned  decline  in the burden  of investment  on the budget  was 
accompanied  by  a  slightly  smaller  decline  in  profit  taxes  (line  10), 
thereby contributing  only  marginally to the narrowing  of the (planned) 
fiscal deficit. If we concentrate  on "above normal" profit taxes, however, 
these  are scheduled  to decline  more steeply  than investments  (line 11), 
and will therefore finance less  and less  of them.  The net contribution of 
the gradual withdrawal  of investment  from the budget  to reducing  the 
deficit depends  on  the  definition  of the proper net concept.  It also de- 
pends  on  the  degree  to which  the  plans  are realized.  If history  is any 
guide,  investment  expenditures  tend  to be overfulfilled  while  profit tax 
revenues  fall  short  of  the  target.10 While  this  is  a  possible  scenario, 
matters have  not yet  developed  the way  they  did in China,  where  the 
decentralization  of investments  was a major factor in the development  of 
a budget  deficit  (Blejer and  Szapary  1989).  The  danger  in  the  Soviet 
Union  lies  more in the  inflationary  impact of the decentralization  deci- 
sion through  nonbudgetary  instruments. 
According  to  official  data  (Ryzhkov  1989a),  defense  expenditures 
stood  at about 9% of GNP in the 1980s, but are scheduled  drop sharply 
in  the  coming  years  (the  planned  level  for 1990 is  7.5%). While  these 
figures  are far higher  than  anything  revealed  hitherto,  most  Western 
estimates  are higher  still, ranging from 12.6 to 15-17% (PlanEcon  Report, 
September  1, 1989, p.  11, and Hanson  1989a, respectively;  see also Ap- 
pendix  Table Al,  part c). The differences  are ascribed to less-than-full 
disclosure  of all expenses  (in other budgetary  items or outside  the bud- 
get), incomplete  accounting  of the cost of the conscript army, and subsidi- 
zation by way  of price manipulation.  The remaining difference between 
the  estimates  underlines  the  limitations  of  the  official budget  data in 
10. The decentralization  of out-of-budget  funds is financed mostly by the release of an 
equivalent  amount of the depreciation  funds to the enterprises. Macroeconomic  Issues  of Soviet  Reforms  *  311 
presenting  the  full  fiscal  picture."  Regardless  of  the  debate  over  the 
relative defense  burden,  it is generally agreed that defense  budgets  have 
been going  down  and can decline  further. 
Expenditures on social welfare (including social services such as educa- 
tion and health) and transfer payments  (mostly pensions)  have stood  at 
around  14% of GNP (Table 1, line 6). Greater openness  and the limited 
democratization  since  1985 revealed  the  very  poor  shape  of the  entire 
sector, resulting in political pressures  and a real need both to revamp the 
services  and improve  the pension  and other income  support programs. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  discovered  that  it lags  behind  most  developed 
Western states in the provision  of social services (Ofer 1989). But despite 
this  realization,  by  1989 less  than  one  GNP  point  was  added  to these 
budgets,  and another half a point is planned for 1990. This sphere will be 
the main expenditure  obstacle to balancing the budget. 
A major and  growing  source  of social welfare  spending  not referred 
to so far is the budget  for subsidies  of basic foods,  housing,  and some 
other  goods  and  services  (line  5).  This budget,  which  stood  at 6% of 
GNP in the early 1970s, has been  climbing  steadily,  and is expected  to 
reach  12% of  GNP  by  1990.  The  increasing  inflationary  pressures  on 
costs  and  the  need  to  preserve  minimum  incentives  for  farmers  to 
increase food  production  will make it necessary  to continue  raising this 
budget  under  the  present  system.  As  in many  other  countries,  subsi- 
dies  have  developed  into  a sensitive  social and  political issue,  despite 
their low  effectiveness  as a progressive  income-maintenance  program. 
In the Soviet  Union  subsidies  also add to the highly  distorted  structure 
of relative prices.  In my opinion,  this budget  item harbors considerable 
potential  for solving  both  the deficit problem and the deficiency  in the 
level of social services. 
The steady  rise in the  budget  for subsidies  is only  one  element  in a 
trend of deteriorating  (net) revenues  from taxes on goods  and services. 
The "turnover" tax has always  been a major source of revenues,  second 
only  to profit taxes  (Table 1, line  12) even  when  taxes on  imports  and 
exports  are included  in  the  latter  (line  13).12 Both  taxes  are imposed 
mostly  (but not  exclusively)  on  consumer  goods,  at highly  differential 
rates  (Senchagov  1989),  with  taxes  on  alcohol  accounting  for  a  very 
11. Subsidization  of defense could be manifested  in lower profits  and/or  lower profit  taxes 
of defense industries  (a tax expenditure)  and/or  higher  consumer  prices  through  either 
cross-subsidization  or the imposition  of sales taxes. 
12. Revenues from foreign trade have traditionally  come from the profits of the foreign 
trade monopoly organization, and reflected the disparities between domestic and 
world prices  at the official  exchange  rate.  Under  the reforms  and the decentralization  of 
foreign  trade  they grew more similar  to regular  tariff  incomes. 312  OFER 
high  proportion.  During  the reform period  the share of revenues  from 
turnover  taxes  in  GNP  deteriorated,  mainly  owing  to  the  campaign 
against  alcohol  (which  has  since  been  lifted).  Foreign  trade revenues, 
which  rose  significantly  with  the  energy  crises,  have  sunk  since  the 
mid-1980s  as  oil  prices  declined  and  a self-imposed  restriction on  im- 
ports  came  in  force.  Despite  efforts  to raise these  incomes,  both  taxes 
are  planned  to  bring  in  only  18% of  GNP  in  1990,  compared  with 
almost  24% in  1981-85.  On  a net  basis  (e.g.,  minus subsidies)  the  de- 
cline  is  sharper  (from  14.6  to  6.7% of  GNP; line  19).  This is  another 
reason  why  a radical change  in  the  role  of  subsidies  can significantly 
contribute to stabilizing  the fiscal situation. 
Finally, as can be seen  from the lines  20, 21 of Table 1, taxes on indi- 
viduals,  like income  and social security taxes, have always accounted for 
only a minor share of budget  revenues.  Part of the distributive function 
of  such  taxes  was  dealt  with  directly  through  the  determination  of 
wages.  With the reforms, the expected  widening  of income differentials, 
and  the  partial decentralization  of wage  determination,  a new  income 
tax law was  introduced.  This law is more progressive,  and is hoped  to 
bring in more revenues  in the future (Tedstrom 1989). The inexperience 
and lack of infrastructure for income-tax  collection,  especially  from the 
expanded  nonstate  sector,  means  that  indirect  taxation  will  probably 
remain  the  main  source  of  revenue  in  the  near  future  (McKinnon 
1989a,b). 
Two  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  First,  although  significant  deficits 
clearly resulted  from steps  taken early on in the economic  reform, the 
old regime  cannot  be cleared on all blame.  On the expenditure  side,  it 
seriously  neglected  social services  and welfare programs, investment  in 
housing  and  infrastructure,  and  was  responsible  for the  development 
of the time-bomb  of extensive  subsidies.  On the revenue  side,  it relied 
excessively  on temporary  sources  of revenues  such as taxes on oil and 
on highly  distortive  turnover taxes.  Inexperience,  the lack of new  fiscal 
instruments,  and the pressing  needs  of the new  system  helped  create a 
fast-growing  deficit,  with  critical consequences  for  the  future  of  the 
reforms. 
The  second  conclusion  is  that  the  budget  will  have  to be balanced, 
at  least  in  the  short  run,  if  the  reform  is  to  proceed,  although  the 
interactions  between  this  process  and  the  main  elements  of economic 
reform remain to be seen.  As matters now  stand,  it seems  that balanc- 
ing  the  budget  is being  attempted  as an independent  act, a precondi- 
tion  for  the  reform,  and  that  the  means  used  are mostly  traditional 
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4. Monetary  Decentralization  and  Monetization  in the 
Production  Sector:  Supply  Response,  Monetary  Expansion, 
or Both13 
Under the classical model  of central planning,  the production sector was 
virtually excluded  from the monetized  part of the economy. Plans and re- 
source allocations,  both inputs and outputs,  were prepared and executed 
in terms of physical supply or purchase orders. Technically, "credits"  or ac- 
counts needed  to execute these orders were established for the enterprises 
in branches of the state bank, but these performed mainly accounting and 
control functions.  In most  cases,  separate accounts were established  for 
expenditures  (inputs) and revenues  (outputs), and very little (if any) shifts 
across accounts were allowed.  Balances remaining in such accounts were 
usually eliminated  at the end of every year, and negative balances (when 
more inputs were needed  to fulfill plan targets) were routinely covered by 
accommodating  credits (Wolf 1985, 1989; Bunich 1988). 
Excess demand  within  the production  sector, thus,  was  typically the 
outcome  of taut physical  planning  or underfulfillment  of plans-not  of 
monetary  expansion.  The main (almost only) true monetary transaction 
of the  production  sector was  wage  payments  to the household  sector. 
Like other enterprise  accounts,  the wage  account was also separate and 
controlled against overruns,  but overruns did occur, creating disequilib- 
rium in the household  sector and consumer  goods  market. 
Decentralization,  introduced  gradually since 1987 (the new  enterprise 
law, the banking  reform),  has  granted  enterprises  increased  powers  to 
determine  production  plans,  modes  of  production,  and  suppliers  and 
buyers-including  some direction in wage  determination  (tied to rises in 
productivity),  the  work  force  (though  major layoffs  are not  expected), 
and even  some  freedom  in the determination  of prices and goods  sold 
under  "contract" and as "new" products.  Enterprises now  have greater 
control  over  investment  decisions;  they  can  finance  outlays  from  the 
increased  proportion  of  profits  that  is  not  taxed  away  (the  new  tax 
schemes  are essentially  regressive)  or from credits  granted  by  the  re- 
formed banking  system.  All these,  together  with  the "monetization" of 
the previously  segmented  bank balances  of the enterprises-permitting 
shifts of balances across accounts-are  steps toward the marketization or 
monetization  of the production  sector as a whole. 
13. The  term  "monetization"  in this paper  refers  to substituting  planning  and "state  orders" 
with the use of money in the production  sector  of the Soviet economy.  The process  of 
monetization  is a necessary  but not a sufficient  condition  for  the full marketization  of the 
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Under  the  new  system  enterprise  managers  are elected  by the work 
force of  the  enterprises.  They  are required  to  maximize  profits  rather 
than output  targets as in the past, with one major exception-the  fulfill- 
ment  of  state  orders.  Such  orders  consist  of products  required by  the 
state  for  its  own  use  (as  in  the  case  of  military  requirements)  or  of 
important  consumer  and producer  goods  that enterprises  would  other- 
wise  prefer not to produce  due to low  profitability.14  Inputs for the pro- 
duction  of  state  orders  are provided  according  to the  old  system.  The 
transition to the new system envisages  a gradual reduction in the propor- 
tion  of  state  orders  to  under  50%. So  far, losing  enterprises  have  not 
been  shut  down;  they  were  covered  by state orders or direct subsidies. 
The reforms also permitted  the creation of limited private and "coopera- 
tive" sectors in almost all branches of the economy.  Such enterprises can 
operate according to free market rules.15 
These  liberalization  steps,  especially  the incentives  to managers  and 
workers  and  the  increased  level  of competition,  were  expected  to pro- 
duce a supply  response  based on the assumed  large inefficiency reserves 
embedded  in every enterprise.  That these  expectations  did not material- 
ize is an understatement.  In fact, 1989 was the first year in a long time in 
which an absolute decline in GNP was recorded (of around 1%  according 
to  the  CIA: see  also  PlanEcon Report, February 21,  1990, p.  1) and  in 
which  a  decline  occurred  in  the  absolute  volume  of  production  in  a 
significant number of key products  (Voronin 1989, p. 47; Pravda,  January 
28,  1990 pp.  1-3).  Several  interrelated  explanations  can be  offered  for 
this  failure,  some  concentrating  on  the  enterprise  level,  others  on  the 
macroeconomic  level;  all may  well  borrow  from the  health  care meta- 
phor: the  medicine  was  much  too weak  but the  side  effects  were  very 
serious. 
1.  The monetization  of the  enterprises'  transactions  and accounts  was 
not accompanied  by a liberalization  of the input  markets,  which  re- 
mained  largely under  state control in order to secure inputs  for state 
orders.  Enterprises with  "monetized"  balances that sought  inputs  in 
order to produce  free goods  were  referred back to the  state supply 
depots-where  they  were  asked  for  state  orders.  When  combined 
with the demand  for inputs  of newly  created private and cooperative 
enterprises,  and  with  the  sellers'  market  in  the  producers'  goods 
sector,  this  situation  can  turn  a sector  with  a manageable  physical 
14. Typical examples  are clothing  and  footwear  for children  or the  elderly, priced below 
cost. 
15. By the end of 1989, about 3 million workers (out of total labor force of 139 million) were 
employed  in newly  created cooperatives  or privately (Zoteyev  1989, p. 36). Macroeconomic  Issues  of Soviet  Reforms  *  315 
disequilibrium  into a narrow market with significant excess monetary 
demand.  Initial shortages  are made  more acute by hoarding  and by 
the  state protecting  its supplies.  The shortage  of producers'  inputs, 
the  very  high  prices  that  developed,  and  the  public  outcry against 
"speculation,"  discouraged  production  activity  in  the  free  market, 
sending  enterprises  back to  the  shelter  of  state  orders.  The partial 
monetization  of enterprise  balances,  the reduced  rate of taxation of 
profits, and the expansion  of credit (see below),  helped  create excess 
money  balances  held  by  enterprises  with  limited  productive  uses. 
The apparent policy error here is in the lopsidedness  of the monetiza- 
tion  process-releasing  or  monetizing  much  more  enterprise  bal- 
ances  than  the  corresponding  supply  of  real  goods.  An  opposite 
approach-expanding  the  monetized  domain  of the  goods  (inputs) 
market in  the  production  sector,  with  limited  monetization  of  old- 
type  enterprise  balances-could  (and  still  can)  serve  as  part  of  a 
sound,  anti-inflationary  monetary  reform.  The  explanation  of  this 
error lies partly in the hesitant  approach to the introduction  of price 
reforms  (we  shall come  to this later) and partly in the concern  over 
losing  essential  state need. 
2.  The partial liberalization  of the banking system-which  allowed  it to 
extend  credit to enterprises,  mostly  for investment  purposes-added 
to monetary  expansion  without  an adequate expansion  of production 
(Bunich 1988; Bochkov  1989; Levchuk 1989; McKinnon 1989a,b). Low 
(even  negative)  real interest  rates,  still determined  centrally except 
for a few  new  cooperative  banks; the inexperience  of new  banks in 
allocating  and  rationing  credit; strong bureaucratic influence  on the 
new  banks; and  the  readiness  (even  eagerness)  of individual  enter- 
prises  to take loans  to replace previous  budget  allocations-all  com- 
bined  to  exert  pressure  on  the  banks  to  grant credit to  the  wrong 
clients and beyond  reasonable  amounts.  With such a long history of 
loans  and budgetary  allocations  that did not have to be repaid, both 
banks  and  enterprises  are playing  this new  game  somewhat  rashly. 
The  atmosphere  of  soft  budget  constraints  not  only  contributes  to 
general  disequilibrium,  it may exert pinpoint  pressure on the invest- 
ment  sector, initiating  too much  investment  in nonessential  projects 
and increasing  the backlog of unfinished  projects. It is quite surpris- 
ing  that the  authorities  did  not  raise interest  rates in order to curb 
some of the demand  for credit, although  as is well known  from West- 
ern  experience,  that  in  the  environment  described  above  this  may 
have proved  effective. 
3.  Contrary to declared  government  policy, there is a clear general ten- 
dency  among  Soviet  public  enterprises  to allow  far higher  wage  in- 316 - OFER 
creases  than  justified  by  the  additional  contribution  to production. 
The  total  nominal  wage  fund  increased  from  7.1  to  8.4% between 
1988 and  1989 (Zoteyev  1989, p.  23) with  little effect on  production 
(see  Appendix  Table Al).  Several conditions  combined  to make this 
possible:  the accumulation  of money  in the hands of enterprises from 
the monetization  process,  the availability of credit, a higher propor- 
tion of retained profits (see above),  and enterprises'  ability to charge 
higher  prices.16 According  to the  new  enterprise  law, managers  are 
now  appointed  by the workers  and have  every  incentive  to cater to 
the  latter's  demands.  Under  present  conditions  there  is more  than 
one  way  to measure  "labor productivity,"  and  there  are alternative 
ways  to raise wages.  The official Soviet data for the last two or three 
years  reveal  wage  hikes  that  are twice  as  high  (or more)  than  the 
estimates  of productivity  gains.  Even when  wage  discipline is perfect 
and in full accordance with increased production,  however,  if produc- 
tion is still locked in unfinished  investment  projects or in the further 
accumulation  of unwanted  goods  purchased  by the government  un- 
der state orders,  the impact on market disequilibrium is the same as 
under excess  payments. 
4.  Under the conditions  described above there is little scope for competi- 
tive  conditions  to  develop.  In addition  to  the  excess  demand  and 
shortages,  created largely by the  self-same  instruments  designed  to 
stimulate  a supply  response,  one  should  note the highly  monopolis- 
tic  structure  of  the  Soviet  production  sector.  Such  a  monopolistic 
structure is a natural manifestation  of the system  of central planning. 
Even when  there are many producers of the same item, their markets 
are allocated centrally and competition  is avoided.  It is hard to break 
these  monopolies  under  the condition  of a sellers' market and with- 
out a price reform. 
5.  In an overheated  economy  profits can be raised in a much simpler way 
than  by  increasing  production  or productivity-through  increasing 
prices within the permitted limits, voluntary contracts on a given pro- 
portion  of total production,  or the development  of "new" products. 
While  price  increases  may  somewhat  narrow  the  degree  of market 
disequilibrium,  some of these  higher prices are paid in the final stage 
by the state, and thus are accommodated  by monetary expansion. 
Another  related way  to increase profits is by shifting the structure 
16. Prime Minister  Ryzhkov  has  recently  complained  that in 1989 enterprises  held  about 
R100 billion,  or slightly more than 10% of the gross volume  of industrial production,  in 
monetary  assets  (1989b,  p.  3).  The  amount  may  not  be  high  by  market  economy 
standards,  and given  the absence  of opportunities  for other financial holdings,  but it is 
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of  production  away  from  low-profit  to  high-profit  products.  This 
would  improve  efficiency  if prices reflected  relative scarcities. Since 
they do not, enterprise profits go up at the expense  of social losses.  A 
common  recent phenomenon  is the replacement  in markets of basic 
low-grade  products  by  higher-quality  ones  (at higher  prices).  This 
relfects the  traditional pricing practice of determining  prices in pro- 
portion  to the  amount  (or value)  of the basic material input.  In this 
way higher-priced  goods  have a lower value-added  content. 
In summary, partial reform creates many opportunities  to increase 
profits,  or, perhaps  more significant,  to increase wages  (and related 
payments)  without  increasing profits. All this comes at a time when  a 
real increase in production  is difficult, mostly due to lack of supplies, 
and to riskier conditions.  With no significant hardening of the budget 
constraint by the authorities  and no serious  challenge  from markets 
and  competition,  the present  steps  of the partial reform opened  up 
easier  opportunities  for enterprise  managers  operating  as agents  to 
simulate  success,  avoid  failure rather than  to perform according  to 
the real intentions  of their principals,  or both.  Indeed,  such  perfor- 
mance has become  very difficult. Put in a context of a principal-agent 
relationship,  the goals,  signals,  and rules of the game of the princi- 
pals became  less  clear, sometimes  erratic. Agents  became somewhat 
more independent-but  were responding  to socially wrong signals- 
and in control of more specific information.  The gap between  the two 
appears  to have  widened.  In this respect,  the partial solutions  and 
initial steps,  at least during the transition period,  seem to have been 
counterproductive  (Ericson  1989). A  considerable  amount  of  effort 
has been  devoted  in the Soviet Union  (and other East European and 
socialist countries)  to redefine a new  structure of property rights that 
will lead to higher levels  of efficiency and better principal-agent coor- 
dination,  while  at the same time conforming  to some minimum  "so- 
cialist" ideological  requirements.  Improvements  in the present  situa- 
tion  are  clearly  feasible  before  a  final  resolution  on  the  extent  of 
"destatization" or privatization  is reached,  but a clearer and credible 
vision  of the final model  will help. 
5. The  Household  Sector:  Liquidity,  Demand  for Savings 
and  Money 
A  sizable  proportion  of  the  excessive  monetary  flows created  by  the 
budget deficit and expansionary  monetary steps in the production sector 
find their way into the household  sector, where they have been accumu- 
lating as a growing  stock of monetary assets-the  notorious  "overhang." Table 2  DEMAND  FOR ASSETS, MONEY AND  SAVING: 1965-1989 
(Annual  data; current billions  of rubles) 
65-70  71-75  76-79  80-82  83-85  86  87  88  89a 
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1.0 Changes  in Savings 
13  Total  6.4  6.7  -6.6  8.5  9.2  2.8  8.6  17.8 
(14+15+16-17) 
14  Changes  in  3.7  4.9  -4.5  6.2  6.5  1.9  5.9  11.2 
change  in SD 
15  Changes  in  1.4  2.2  -2.0  2.2  2.5  0.7  2.9  6.6 
change  in 
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of the econ- 
omy 
19  Retail price in-  100.00  105.54  113.02  122.68  131.44  138.27  140.34  147.55  159.41 
dex 
20  All financial  0.055  0.095  0.104  0.100  0.097  0.096  0.099  0.100  0.099 
assets/capital 
stock (3/18) Table 2  DEMAND  FOR ASSETS, MONEY AND  SAVING: 1965-1989 
(Annual  data; current billions  of rubles) (Continued) 
65-70  71-75  76-79  80-82  83-85  86  87  88  89a 
Ratios: 
Assets  to Income 
21  All financial  0.272  0.512  0.663  0.733  0.798  0.869  0.926  0.954  0.975 
assets  (3/1) 
22  Savings  ac-  0.216  0.359  0.468  0.533  0.585  0.647  0.686  0.705  0.714 
counts  (4/1) 
23  Cash (5/1)  0.061  0.123  0.180  0.188  0.201  0.208  0.224  0.238  0.250 
Savings  to income 
24  All financial  0.049  0.065  0.076  0.044  0.064  0.083  0.088  0.101  0.128 
assets  (8/1) 
25  Saving ac-  0.036  0.043  0.052  0.030  0.045  0.059  0.061  0.071  0.087 
counts  (9/1) 
26  Cash (10/1)  0.014  0.016  0.021  0.011  0.017  0.022  0.023  0.028  0.039 
Change  in Saving  to Change  in Income 
27  All financial  0.101  0.114  -0.147  0.228  0.335  0.203  0.269  0.341 
assets  (13/2) 
28  Saving ac-  0.059  0.084  -0.099  0.165  0.237  0.136  0.185  0.215 
counts  (14/2) 
29  Cash (15/2)  0.022  0.037  -0.045  0.060  0.092  0.050  0.091  0.126 
Sources:  CIA (1989a); PlanEcon Report, September  1, 1989; November  24,  1989; Capital  Stock-Narodnoe  Khoziaistvo (The National  Economy),  various  years; 
Price index,  CIA (1989a), Table a-3, p.  15, and CIA (1989b), Table 15, p. 39. 1989: PlanEcon Report, February 21, 1990, pp.  15, 16. 
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The "household"  sector here includes  the entire part of the Soviet econ- 
omy  in which  transactions  were  always  conducted  in cash  (henceforth 
referred to as the monetized  or marketized  sector). It includes,  in addi- 
tion to households,  private agricultural production  and distribution  (on 
private plots and in some collective and state farms), and activities in the 
"second," unofficial economy.7 
Before the  reforms,  the  household  sector  had  been  in  a permanent 
state of excess  demand,  expressed  mostly in the form of repressed  infla- 
tion,  since  most  prices were  kept at given  levels  for extended  periods. 
This state of excess  demand  was the outcome  of two all-pervading phe- 
nomena:  (1)  Actual  wage  bills  usually  exceeded  planned  wage  pay- 
ments,  and  plans  for production  of consumer  goods  were  never  fully 
realized and (2) the plans  themselves  contained  a calculated element  of 
excess  demand  (the wage  bill was  systematically  set somewhat  higher 
than the consumption  bill plus assumed  voluntary savings) to assure that 
markets would  clear and no surpluses  would  accumulate. 
A sizable body  of literature has appeared on the extent of the disequi- 
librium in  Soviet  (and  other  centrally  planned  economies')  consumer 
markets and  on the ways  in which  it was  expressed  or resolved.  Some 
researchers (notably Igor Birman 1981) produced  very high estimates  of 
this market's size,  and claimed  that most  of it was  channeled  into con- 
stantly  growing  unwanted  savings  and  cash  balances.  These  balances 
form the monetary  overhang  that threatens  an imminent  market crisis. 
Others,  like Portes (1984), Pickersgill (1980), Nuti  (1985), and Ofer and 
Pickersgill  (1980),  either  arrived  at  lower  estimates  of  the  overhang, 
emphasized  alternative  avenues  or  safety  values  aimed  at taking  the 
pressure  off the  consumer  market,  or both.  The main such  alternative 
was  the  expansion  of  the  second  economy,  in  both  real volume  and 
relative prices, and a decline in labor working in the public sector, trans- 
ferring some  workers to the second  economy.18 
It seems  clear by now  that whatever  the extent  of the inherited  and 
accumulated  disequilibrium,  say, in 1985-and  I believe  it was  not very 
large-it  has grown  significantly  since then.  The rise in the size of gov- 
ernment deficits and the excessive  increase in wages and other monetary 
flows  affected  the  situation  in  the  consumer  goods  markets.  They 
brought  with  them  a significant  expansion  in liquid assets  held  by the 
population  and price increases  in free (and even  in public) markets (see 
Table 2 and discussion  below).  There is little doubt,  from reports on the 
17. These  were  estimated  at 15-20% of the transactions of urban households,  even  in the 
1970s  (Grossman  1987,  Ofer  and Vinokur  1980). 
18. Two recent surveys of the literature  in the prereform  era are Nuti (1985)  and van 
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situation in the consumer  goods  markets, that disequilibrium has wors- 
ened  considerably  in the past two or three years. 
Past debates  over  the  extent  of disequilibrium  under  the  old regime 
paid  relatively  little  attention  to  the  specific  factors of  the  Soviet  eco- 
nomic system  that could  have affected households'  demand  for money, 
demand  for  assets  and  savings,  and  the  unique  interaction  between 
them. The demand  side is clearly no less important than the supply  side 
in determining  conditions  for equilibrium.  When  such differences  were 
taken into account,  however,  the standand  assumption  was  that under 
Soviet  conditions  there  was  no  need  or room  for personal  savings,  as 
indeed  was  the  case  up  to  the  mid-1950s.  Therefore,  when  personal 
saving  rates started to grow, they were interpreted  as a clear indication 
of the development  of disequilibrium.'9 
5.1 THE DEMAND  FOR MONEY AND  ASSETS (SAVINGS) 
The first thing to note is the strong interrelation between  the demand for 
money  and the demand  for savings  and assets.  Money, defined  here as 
cash,  and the very liquid  saving  accounts,  bearing 2-3% interest rates, 
are virtually the sole assets  that can legally be held in unlimited  quanti- 
ties.  People  select  cash  or savings  according  to  the  interest  rate,  and 
depending  on security and concealment  considerations.  In addition, peo- 
ple  can own  a cooperative  apartment  and/or a Dacha,  a car and  other 
durable  goods,  jewelry  and  art,  and-in  the  countryside-some  live- 
stock and small gardens.  Lacking consumer  credit, however,  savings are 
needed  for short- and medium-term  transactions. 
In the classical Soviet  system,  typical life-cycle motivations  for saving 
are  much  weaker  than  in  market  economies:  the  life-cycle  profile  of 
wages-almost  the  sole  source  of income-was  much  flatter; the  state 
was responsible  for pensions,  education,  housing  (in rented apartments 
with  highly  subsidized  rents),  disability  insurance,  and  employment. 
The rate of interest  had  always  been  very  low,  even  in the  absence  of 
inflation,  and the  choice  of assets  was  nil. This means  that savings  are 
concentrated  in cash and saving  deposits.  The absence of most forms of 
consumer  credit (limited to mortgages  on cooperative apartments) oper- 
ates in favor of savings,  since anyone  planning  a costly purchase would 
have  to  precede  it  by  a period  of  saving.  Furthermore,  the  doubtful 
availability of many  goods,  and the erratic timing,  forces consumers  to 
be prepared-a  kind of precautionary demand  for savings.  Finally, there 
is no inheritance  tax, which  also encourages  saving. 
19. I have argued elsewhere that private saving rates in the 1970s were not obviously 
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Three developments  in the post-Stalinist  era could have increased the 
general propensity  of the population  to save.  First is the general rise in 
the  standard  of living.  Second  is the  growing  expectation  of increased 
opportunities  for higher levels  of consumption.  Third is both the rise in 
the  standard  of living  until  the  mid-1970s  and  the deterioration  in the 
relative  level  and  quality  of  the  supply  of  public  services  and  social 
security payments-pensions  had to be supplemented,  proper medical 
care (and  in  some  cases  higher  education)  involved  large private pay- 
ments,  and housing  remained a constant problem. Based on data for the 
1970s,  we  concluded  that  saving  rates in  the  Soviet  Union  should  be 
about as high as those  in market economies  (ibid.). 
The secular aging  of the Soviet population,  other things being equal, 
should  have reduced  the overall level  of saving,  as it has done  in many 
other countries (Bosworth,  1989), thereby possibly offsetting some of the 
above-mentioned  trends.  But since  private  saving  is a relatively recent 
phenomenon,  and  the  present  elderly  population  does  not  possess 
many assets to dissave  from, the effect of aging may be weaker here than 
in other countries. 
Since  then,  and  until  the beginning  of the  reforms,  expectations  for 
improved  consumption  opportunities  in the future may have subsided, 
but  the  need  to  supplement  state  social  security  programs  with  per- 
sonal  savings  and  to  cope  with  rising  short-term  uncertainties  has 
clearly increased. 
Table 2 summarizes  estimates  by the CIA (1989a,b) and PlanEcon Re- 
port (1989) of trends in savings  and asset holding by the household  sector 
since 1955. According to these estimates  the average rate of saving out of 
disposable  money  income  grew  from  1.7% in  1955  (not  shown)  to 
around  5.2% in  1975-79,  and  declined  to 3.0% in  1980-82.  Since  1982 
there  has  been  an increasing  trend  into  the  period  of  the  reforms; by 
1988 new  savings reached 7.1% of income (8.7% in 1989, Table 2, line 25). 
When  savings  are defined  to include  the  accumulation  of all financial 
assets,  including  cash,  the  corresponding  rates  are higher  in  the  last 
decade  by  slightly  more  than  a third  (about  7.5% for  the  late  1970s, 
around  5% for  the  early  1980s),  but  rose  significantly  since  then  to 
around  10% and  up  to  12% in  1989 (line  24).20 Such  rates  cannot  be 
considered  excessive,  but their rise is indicative of the growing  pressure 
of repressed  inflation. 
Over the period,  the ratio of the stock of monetary  assets  to personal 
disposable  income  grew  from 0.22 (0.27 with  cash holdings)  in 1960-65 
20. In general marginal saving  rates also increased  toward the end of the period,  with the 
exception  of 1989 (lines 27-29).  It is not clear to what extent this is a change in trend or 
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to 0.53 (0.73) in 1980-82  and 0.71 (0.96) in 1988 and 1989 (lines 21-23). 
While this rise is impressive,  and the rise in total assets is probably even 
steeper,21 the  final  level  is  clearly not  high  by  international  standards 
and the high proportion of liquid assets in total wealth reflects the limita- 
tions on asset  holdings.  This can be seen  in line 20 of Table 2: the ratio 
between  the holdings  of financial assets by households  and an estimate 
of the value of the entire capital stock in the country is computed.  While 
this ratio has growing  over time, it is still very low, pointing  to the large 
potential  of asset  transfers to the household  sector. Finally, the ratios of 
cash holdings  and cash accumulating  to income  (average and marginal) 
has been rising throughout  the period (lines 23, 26, 29), but they should 
not necessarily be deemed  too high, even recently. Household  cash hold- 
ings  amount  in  1989 to one  quarter of annual  income,  and  the rate of 
savings  in cash in 3-4%. 
Systemic  differences  call for a higher  demand  for money  in Socialist 
economies  relative to market economies.  This is due to increased transac- 
tions  demand,  since  there  is no  credit; to increased  precautionary  de- 
mand, because of greater uncertainty about the availability of goods; and 
to  asset  demand,  since  money  is  the  sole  asset  that  can  be  held  by 
households. 
With the introduction  of the reforms, a number of sets of changes with 
potentially  significant  effects on the demand  for both money  and assets 
(and savings)  have  been  developing.  The first set of changes  has to do 
with  the increased  level  of uncertainty  as to the fate of the reforms and 
the  regime,  especially  expectations  of a much  higher  rate of inflation, 
and of shortages and supply  uncertainties.  The second set of changes are 
those  connected  with  the  transition to the new  economic  system:  there 
are expectations  of fears of a monetary reform that may tax away the real 
value  of  liquid  assets;2  and  inflation  may  be  used  deliberately  by  the 
government  as part of the monetary reform or develop  as a side effect of 
other policy  measures,  like a price reform, a devaluation,  and the like. 
The  effect  of  most  of  these  expectations  is  to reduce  the  demand  for 
nominal assets  of all kinds and increase the pressure on the goods  mar- 
ket and that for real assets,  including  illegal assets like foreign currency. 
The  third  set  of  changes  has  to  do  with  expectations  for  the  new 
economic  system  in  the  longer  run.  If such  expectations  are that  the 
Soviet system will move in the direction of a Western-style mixed-market 
21. One estimate  for the early 1970s puts real assets  (apartments, cars, etc.) held by urban 
households  at about one-third  of their total wealth  (Ofer and Pickersgill 1980). 
22. A  monetary  reform  in  1947 confiscated  a  large  proportion  of  then-existing  money 
balances held by the population  through the unfavorable exchange  of the newly  intro- 
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system  with  higher  levels  of risks and rewards,  including  destatization 
and privatization  of productive  enterprises  and  other real assets,  then 
the demand  functions  for money  (and especially  for assets)  should  also 
start to  move  upward.  In addition  to a higher  size  of the  portfolio  of 
assets-a  higher  target level  of assets  relative to incomes-there  would 
also be a signifcant  structural change  in the portfolio,  away from finan- 
cial and  toward  real assets  (either  stocks  or actual production  assets), 
and  from  low-  to  high-yielding  assets.  The level  and  structure of  the 
shifts  will  depend  on  the  relative  weight  that  households  ascribe  to 
transitional  and  long-term  factors,  and  these,  in  turn,  depend  on  the 
situation  as  it develops  in  practice and  on  the  policies  of the  govern- 
ment.  With sound  policies,  which  may  tilt the balance toward  longer- 
term considerations,  a temporary increase may develop  in the demand 
for nominal  assets,  in preparation for the time when real assets are put on 
sale.  Similar behavior  can be expected  from enterprises,  once  they  are 
able to purchase  productive  assets.  Policies that may bring such an out- 
come are discussed  in the next section. 
The state  can offer its citizens  a very  large volume  of real assets  for 
sale, as it owns  almost all productive  assets,  most of the housing  stock, 
and the entire stock of land. It also "owns" the right to grant households 
legal permission  of existing  economic  distortions and inefficiencies.  The 
main obstacles  to such an exchange  of money  for real assets are first and 
foremost  ideological  and political,  but also stem from the lack of legal, 
institutional,  and  know-how  infrastructures,  and  from the  need  for a 
much higher degree of mutual trust and credibility beteen the two sides. 
The mixed  experience  of the first steps  of allowing  limited private and 
cooperative  ownership  of production  capital underscores  all these prob- 
lems.  At  this  point  it seems  that the  first set of factors has  the upper 
hand,  and that the rise in savings  and money  holdings  (Table 2) reflects 
repressed  inflation and an increased level of disequilibrium. 
6. Conclusion:  Short-Term  Stabilization  and  Long-Term 
Reforms:  Policy  Options 
What are the  policy  implications  for stabilization and economic  reform 
strategies?  Three  major  stereotyped  options  present  themselves.  The 
first option is, a radical reform entailing marketization, free prices, rapid 
movement  toward  private  ownership  of means  of production,  and  an 
opening  up  of the  economy.  The almost  inevitable  open  inflation  that 
will accompany such a reform will be an essential healing element,  stimu- 
lating enterprises  to adopt  a free market pattern of behavior.  Stabiliza- 
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The  second,  and  polar  option  is  to  opt  for stabilization  in  isolation 
from the  reform,  indeed,  as a necessary  retreat from reform until  the 
conditions  needed  for them  can be  prepared.  Stabilization  under  this 
option must be achieved  through  central direction and control. In a way 
this  is  a "second-try"  strategy-an  admission  that the  first attempt  at 
reforms failed. 
The third strategy also involves  stabilization first, but this time stabili- 
zation is considered  within  the framework of future reforms, where both 
the general  direction  of the reforms and its individual  aspects  are used 
for a more successful  stabilization. 
The last two strategies involve  a gradual step-by-step  approach, while 
the  first is  more  of  a  "big bang"  approach.  Under  Soviet  conditions, 
where a high rate of open inflation has not yet developed  and where the 
size  of the economy  and  other factors preclude  the world  market from 
playing  an  important  initial  role,  a big  bang  approach  should,  in  my 
view,  be avoided.  The announced  program of the Soviet Union  for the 
coming  years is clearly a step-by-step  strategy, addressing  the stabiliza- 
tion  problem  first.  It tends  to tilt too  heavily  in  the  direction  of more 
conservative  or revisionist  variants of the gradual approach, though  like 
most  real-life programs,  it includes  a small number of forward-looking 
elements  as well.  I am convinced,  however,  that it is too late to resort to 
the  old  instruments  and  that without  adequate  new  steps  the  present 
reform instruments  may not be able to produce  more results than they 
did in the past five years.  The major step  missing,  in my view,  though 
not  the  only  one,  is  a major program  of one off price revision that will 
correct the  distorted  relative  price  structure,  absorb some  of the  over- 
hang,  and (hopefully)  form a set of stable expectations. 
As  a  candidate  for  a  stabilization  program,  the  Soviet  economy  in 
some ways  resembles  other market economies  in need of such programs 
but  in  other  ways  differs  from  them.  Like other  countries,  the  Soviet 
Union  suffers  from a large fiscal deficit,  and from "fundamentals"  that 
need  to be taken  care of. There are expectations  for inflation accompa- 
nied by strong pressures  on the goods  markets and those  for real assets 
(including  foreign  currency),  and  there is a need  to (re)monetize  large 
parts of the economy,  though  not only in the usual sense  of reestablish- 
ing the value of the ruble but also in the sense  of spreading the use of the 
ruble across the production  sector. While most prices are held relatively 
constant,  as  is  the  rate of  exchange,  they  cannot  and  do  not  serve  as 
credible nominal  anchors under the present circumstances. 
The main differences  are in three areas. First, open inflation rate is still 
low;  the  country  does  not  yet  suffer  from the  secondary  effects  of an 
inflationary  spiral  and  inflationary  inertia  such  as  indexation  and  the Macroeconomic  Issues  of Soviet  Reforms  *  327 
building  up  of permanent  inflationary  expectations.3  Second,  some  of 
the  main reform goals-the  monetization  of the production  sector and 
the  marketization  of  the  economy-can  be  developed  into  powerful 
tools.  If they can gain credibility, they can assist in the stabilization. 
Finally, the  Soviet  Union  lacks the  macro- and microeconomic  tools, 
institutions  and  infrastructure,  and  the  experience  needed  to respond 
quickly and efficiently  to changes  in economic  signals and variables. On 
the macroeconomic  level,  the missing  elements  are a credible legal sys- 
tem for mediation between  agents and protection against the state, and a 
solid and experienced  central bank and credit system.  The existing "mar- 
kets"  are  highly  monopolized  due  to  the  old  division  of  production 
between  ministries responsible  for given lines of goods.  Also lacking are 
correct prices and any experience  in free, market-determined  prices. On 
the microeconomic  level there is no familiarity with market conditions- 
no new ownership  relations, no new decision-making  structures, hierar- 
chies of command,  and accounting  procedures.  When the price system 
is wrong,  even  correct behavior  according to the new  rules will lead to 
resource  misallocations.  Coordination  reforms  on  both  the  macro and 
micro levels  are,  of  course,  drawn-out  processes  that cannot  be  intro- 
duced overnight.  As mentioned  above,  the potential contribution of the 
world economy,  or market economies  are also limited. 
Under these  conditions  a "big bang" move into a free market environ- 
ment would  probably be counterproductive.  Not  only could open  high 
inflation  (with  the  attendant  need  to  counteract  it using  a variety  of 
"heterodox"  means),  be  avoided,  but  it is  highly  doubtful  that enter- 
prises  that  are neither  equipped  nor ready  to operate  under  ordinary 
market conditions  will be able to do so under conditions  of high inflation 
and inadequate  macroeconomic  guidance. 
Stabilization should  be firmly in place far before the production sector 
completes  its adjustment  to a hard budget environment.  It is also needed 
in order to create a favorable environment  for marketization and destat- 
ization reforms.  The main difference between  the big bang and gradual 
approach is that under the latter most prices, including  the rate of inter- 
est  and  rate of  exchange,  are not  left  to be  freely  determined  by  the 
market straight  away;  they  are first adjusted  and  then  regulated  until 
stabilization  is been  secured.  The stabilization  program does  include  a 
major price revision  that will set relative prices approximately right and 
absorb part of the overhang. 
23. True,  there are various alternative  protective  arrangements  against  shortages,  such as 
direct  supplies of "deficit"  goods (like  meat) to privileged  enterprises  and institutions, 
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Without  a price revision  eliminating  most  subsidies,  it is difficult to 
see  how  the budget  can be  truly balanced  over a short period  of time. 
The present plan seeks to reduce the deficit to 2.5% of GDP by the end of 
1992, but is neither  radical nor realistic enough.  A major elimination  of 
subsidies  can  free  enough  resources  to  make  up  the  income  of  the 
weaker part of the population  and improve  other aspects  of the welfare 
state, still leaving  perhaps  half the same amount  to narrow the deficit.24 
The price revision  could  also unify  the turnover tax on most goods  and 
services,  leaving  it as a major source  of budgetary  income  (McKinnon 
1989a,b). 
A price revision  that will  set relative scarcities in the economy  about 
right can be used  as a base  for the imposition  of a harder budget  con- 
straint on enterprises,  allowing  them to invest  if they make profits, take 
credit at higher interest rates if they are able to repay, and to buy and sell 
in the  input  markets-all  much  more  freely  than hitherto,  when  their 
achievements  did not reflect social benefits.  The establishment  of correct 
prices will  also  help  in the  process  of marketization  of the  production 
sector and  thus  promote  stabilization  in the  monetary  markets.  While 
controls  over  the  determination  of credit,  wages  and,  of course  prices 
will have to be rather strict, there will be a more sound  environment  for 
their gradual  relaxation.  In an environment  of stable prices it is much 
easier to use a higher real interest rate as a regulator of credits than in an 
environment  of  high  open  inflation.  With more-or-less  correct prices, 
losing  enterprises  can declare bankruptcy, labor can be mobilized,  and 
there can be a meaningful  beginning  of offering  public enterprises  for 
sale or lease to cooperatives  or private agents.  These will help break the 
monopolistic  structure of production.  All the above will be much more 
difficult  to  achieve  without  a price  revision  and  the  government  will 
have to resort more and more to direct controls and physical allocation, 
as indeed  it is planning  to do (Ryzhkov 1989b).25 
The price revision,  including  a devaluation  of the ruble, will serve as 
part of the long-awaited  monetary reform. It will confiscate some existing 
real balances  (highly  concentrated  in the hands  of the rich), and reduce 
real incomes.  The new prices will become a more credible anchor, at least 
for some  time.  Once  monetary  and  fiscal reforms are well  established, 
24. Such saving is possible because the subsidy bill is only very weakly progressive.  Actu- 
ally, subsidies are distributed  approximately  equally,  in absolute  amounts, among the 
various population deciles (Ofer and Vinokur 1988). More targeted  income support 
programs  can achieve better  welfare  results  at a far smaller  cost. 
25. Among other things, Ryzhkov recommends a return of the production sector to 
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including  interest  and  exchange  rates,  expectations  for an inflationary 
spiral may  be  partly mitigated,  increasing  the  prospects  for increased 
demand for nominal assets as explained  above, a further contribution for 
stabilization. 
The ability to sell or lease property, state apartments,26 enterprises  (or 
shares  in  enterprises),  and  land  will  raise  demand  for  savings  and 
money, and help in achieving  stabilization. It is hard to see how property 
can change  hands  before a reasonably  rational price structure is set up. 
The actual execution  of this policy will create credibility in the sincerity 
of the government,  thus  further contributing to stability. The prospects 
of the near creation of a real market environment  with higher risks, but 
with  chances  for higher  economic  rewards,  will also boost  the demand 
for assets.  The same applies to excess money in the hands of enterprises. 
It is difficult to see all this happening  in a revisionist  environment. 
One  institution  of the market economy  (besides  a free price system) 
that  should  wait  until  after  stabilization  is  the  introduction  of  liberal 
credit arrangements in the consumer sector, the reason being their poten- 
tial negative  effect on saving. 
In addition to the obvious  difficulties in establishing the right level and 
speed of change in the various tools used,  there are at least two principal 
difficulties. First, the idea of a price revision is widely resisted on political 
and social grounds.  There is little faith in the ability of the government  to 
compensate  adequately, and even less trust in the power of the new price 
structure to help  bring  about  equilibrium  in consumer  markets.  There 
may also be vested-interest  groups in administration circles, who have so 
far been assured of supplies at official  prices  outside the regular distribution 
networks.  Adequate compensation  to the weakest third of the population 
may  help  weaken  such  resistance,  perhaps  by  raising  retirement  and 
other social security payments  and through an increase in the minimum 
wage.  As to the lack of faith in markets-this  is a difficult issue and there 
are many in the Soviet  Union,  including  many economists,  who  would 
prefer to solve the shortages problem by rationing (Ryzhkov 1989b, Hew- 
ett 1989). Here the government  must take the necessary  political risks in 
the hope that people  will soon discover that balanced markets with avail- 
able goods,  albeit at higher prices, are preferable to empty  markets or a 
gray market with  exorbitant prices. If the assumption  that a reform with 
price revision will generate a better supply response  is plausible, then the 
risk of a one-time  price move  is even  smaller. It may be advisable  and 
helpful to cushion the initial stages of stabilization with a one-time supply 
26. The successful sale of apartments  depends on raising  the present  level of rents, which 
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of food and other consumer goods through imports. In addition to their 
supply effect such imports are also great absorbers  of income due to the 
high turnover  taxes imposed on them.27 
The second  problem  is that prices cannot stay constant for long even 
with a sound price revision. Indeed, the need to postpone full price 
liberalization at the outset  reduces  the effectiveness  of the reform  part of 
the program. The true price reform must come with minimum delay. It is 
argued that a more daring stabilization program, with potentially  much 
faster results,  may allow  price liberalization sooner-and  with  less  risk 
of inflation-than  when  the  stabilization  efforts  drag on  interminably 
with modest  results. 
A  stabilization  program  with  a major price revision  will  impose  an 
immediate  and  sizable burden  on most  of the population.  The political 
risks are, therefore,  higher and there may be a point in speeding  up the 
process  of  democratization  before  taking  such  a step.  With a govern- 
ment run single-handedly  by the Communist  party, the populist  voices 
unleashed  by glasnost policies and partial democratization,  demanding  a 
voice  in government  but refusing  to share the necessary  burden  of the 
transition,  are gaining  momentum.  A more representative  government 
and  a  diminished  role  of  the  Party (in  accordance  with  the  political 
reforms  of  last  March) may  prove  better  able to  demand  and  in  turn 
receive a quid pro quo from the people. 
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Appendix  Table Al  USSR ECONOMIC DATA 1970-1989 
a. Basic Data 1988 
Population  (millions)  286.4 
GNP: 1988 US $ (billion)a  2,535.3 
GNP per capita: 1988 US $a  8,850.0 
Life expectancy  (years)  69.0 
Source:  CIA (1989b), Tables 2, 3, pp. 24-25. 
aData converted  at U.S.  purchasing  power  equivalent.  U.S.  GNP per capita is $19,770. 
b. Average  Annual Rates of Growth 
1970-75  1975-80  1980-85  1986  1987  1988  1989a 
GNP  3.1  2.1  1.9  4.0  1.3  1.5  -1.0 
Industry  5.6  2.4  2.0  2.7  2.9  2.4 
Agriculture  -2.3  0.2  1.2  10.3  -4.0  -3.2 
Services  3.4  2.7  2.2  2.3  3.2  3.5 
Consumption  3.5  2.5  2.0  1.8  2.8  2.4 
Investment  5.0  3.9  3.3  5.4  1.3  2.2 
Defense  2.0  2-3  2-3  0.0  0.0 
GNP per capita  2.2  1.3  1.0  3.0  0.2  0.5  -1.9 
Consumption 
per capita  3.0  2.0  1.1  -1.5  1.0  1.5 
Inputs:b Total 
Man-hours  2.2  1.4  0.7  0.7  0.5  -1.2 
Capital  7.5  6.4  5.4  4.4  3.6 
Total factor pro- 
ductivity  0.4  -1.4  -1.2  0.0  0.4 
Population  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
Sources:  CIA (1989b), Tables 32-36,  pp. 58-60; PlanEcon  Report,  February 21, 1990. 
aProvisional. 
bNonagriculture nonservices  GNP. 334  OFER 
Appendix Table  Al  USSR  ECONOMIC  DATA 1970-1989  (CONTINUED) 
c. Structural  Indicators 
1960  1987 
GNP Sharesa 
Agriculture  34.0  19.0 
M+  39.0  53.0 
S+  27.0  28.0 
Consumption  54.0  54.0 
Investment  22.0  33.0 
Defense  12.0  15-17 
Source:  CIA  (1989b),  Table  33, p. 59. 
a1982  factor  cost. 
d. Foreign  Trade  & Debt  (current  U.S. billion  $) 
1970  1980  1988 
Total:  Export  12.80  76.40  110.70 
Import  11.70  68.50  107.30 
Hard  currency: 
Export  1.40  27.90  31.20 
Import  2.70  26.10  28.50 
Current  account  balance  0.10  1.50  1.30 
Debt:  Gross  1.80  20.00  42.30 
Net  0.60  10.50  27.90 
Debt service ratio  0.10  0.19  0.22 
Source:  CIA  (1989b),  Tables  136, 139, pp. 159, 162. 
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As Gur Ofer makes clear in his fine paper, a central feature of the contem- 
porary Soviet  macroeconomic  scene  is the  notably  large budget  deficit 
that the government  has been  running  lately, and the associated  macro- 
imbalance  in  the  consumers'  goods  market.  Ofer presents  data on  the 
budget  deficit  in  several  variants,  but  they  relate  to  only  two  of  the 
critical Gorbachev  years  and  represent  only  planned  targets.  Further 
data that have  only lately become  available, however,  indicate the same 
striking upsurge  as Ofer depicts. 
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Appendix Table  Al  USSR  ECONOMIC  DATA 1970-1989  (CONTINUED) 
c. Structural  Indicators 
1960  1987 
GNP Sharesa 
Agriculture  34.0  19.0 
M+  39.0  53.0 
S+  27.0  28.0 
Consumption  54.0  54.0 
Investment  22.0  33.0 
Defense  12.0  15-17 
Source:  CIA  (1989b),  Table  33, p. 59. 
a1982  factor  cost. 
d. Foreign  Trade  & Debt  (current  U.S. billion  $) 
1970  1980  1988 
Total:  Export  12.80  76.40  110.70 
Import  11.70  68.50  107.30 
Hard  currency: 
Export  1.40  27.90  31.20 
Import  2.70  26.10  28.50 
Current  account  balance  0.10  1.50  1.30 
Debt:  Gross  1.80  20.00  42.30 
Net  0.60  10.50  27.90 
Debt service ratio  0.10  0.19  0.22 
Source:  CIA  (1989b),  Tables  136, 139, pp. 159, 162. 
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Table  1  DEFICIT,  SOVIET  GOVERNMENT  BUDGET,  1985-90a 
Deficit 
Bil.  Per cent 
rubles  of GDP 
Year  (1)  (2) 
1985  13.9  1.8 
1986  45.5  5.7 
1987  52.5  6.4 
1988  80.6  9.3 
1989  92  9.9 
1990  (Plan)  60  6.0 
aSources:  (1) 1985-88, see text and TSSU  (1989,  pp. 624-625;  1989,  Pravda  (January  28, 1990);  1990,  FBIS 
(November  13, 1989,  p. 45);  (2)  GDP  figures  from  Gur  Ofer  (1989)  and Ofer's  present  paper,  but see also 
FBIS  (December  14, 1989,  p. 46). 
as officially recorded.'  Among  Ofer's various budgets,  the primary one 
statistically  is his  "total deficit."  This is the  same  as the official deficit, 
except the total deficit includes and the official deficit excludes net govern- 
ment bond purchases  by households.  The inclusion  of such purchases in 
the  deficit  is  for  the  good  from  the  standpoint  of  Western budgetary 
norms; but an interesting  question,  which has yet to be fully explored,  is 
how  closely  the total deficit as thus delineated  conforms to such norms.2 
The  government  budget  deficit  is of interest,  but  the  more  ultimate 
concern is the macrobalance in the consumers'  goods  market. From the 
consumers'  goods  market standpoint  it would  be useful,  so far as avail- 
able  data  permit,  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  government  budget  to 
embrace extramarket activities  in the economy  more generally-that  is, 
to  include  among  the  expenditures  the  self-financed  investment  and 
capital  repairs  of  state  enterprise,  and  among  the  revenues  current 
earnings available for financing  such expenditures,  principally deprecia- 
tion charges and retained profits not disbursed  to households. 
1. I refer to revenues  other than "loan funds,"  which in TSSU (1989, p. 624) are included  in 
total revenues. 
2. One not insignificant  case of nonconformity,  according to some analysts,  is that defense 
expenditures  are only  partially covered  in  the  published  budget.  In fact, as is widely 
agreed  and  lately  acknowledged  even  in  the  USSR,  the  traditional  expenditure  line 
"defense"  in published  Soviet  budgets  covers  only  a minor fraction of what  would  be 
classified  as defense  outlays  in the West. But as the CIA seems  to consider,  the remain- 
ing  defense  outlays  are probably  classified  under  other  budget  headings  rather than 
being omitted  from the published  budget  altogether. 
While  Ofer  in  principle  includes  in  the  total  deficit  net  purchases  of  government 
bonds,  he inadvertently  seems  to refer instead  to the official deficit for the Gorbachev 
years,  at least  in respect  to plan targets for 1990. Such purchases  appear to have been 
minute for some  time, but according to the budget  plan for 1990, gross sales are to be 15 
billion  and  redemptions,  while  increasing,  are not  to be  nearly  that large.  See  TSSU 
(1989, p. 624), CIA (1989, p.  11), and FBIS (September 28, 1989, p. 37ff). 336  OFER 
In view  of the  substantially  self-contained  nature of the Soviet econ- 
omy and the inconvertibility  of the ruble, it would  also be appropriate to 
treat external transactions differently from the way they are now treated. 
At  present  one  of  the  government  budget  revenue  lines  is  "incomes 
from  foreign  economic  activity." This  item  consists  principally  of  the 
excess of customs  duties  on imports over subsidies  on exports. In Soviet 
circumstances,  the  customs  duties  and  subsidies  must  be  understood 
elliptically as representing  respectively  the excess of the domestic whole- 
sale prices of imports  over world  prices, and the excess  of the domestic 
prices  of exports  over  world  prices.  World prices are foreign  currency 
prices converted  to rubles at the official exchange  rate.3 
There is also a line relating to foreign transactions on the expenditure 
side  of the  government  budget.  This line,  entitled  "financing external 
economic  activities," comprises  the servicing of foreign debt, funding  of 
credits  and  nonrepayable  aid  to  foreign  debt,  funding  of  credits  and 
nonrepayable  aid to foreign governments,  and financing of foreign trade 
more generally  (FBIS, September 28, 1989, p. 42). 
In the extended  government  budget  that I envisage-and  shall call the 
public  sector budget-both  the  foreign  revenue  and  expenditure  lines 
are substantially, if not completely,  deleted.  In their place there would be 
one item on the outlay side,  net exports. In calculating net exports, both 
exports and imports are to be valued  at domestic wholesale  prices.4 
It is the public  sector budget  as so construed  that is immediately  re- 
lated to the macrobalance in the consumers'  goods  market. A deficit in 
that budget  should  translate itself into an excess of money income accru- 
ing to households  from the public sector over the corresponding  volume 
of consumers'  goods  supplied.  The excess is offset by households,  volun- 
tarily or involuntarily,  through  their purchases  of government  bonds, 
deposits in savings banks, and accumulation of cash-in  effect, by house- 
hold money  savings,  whether  voluntary  or involuntary.5 
The  public  sector  budget,  as is  appropriate,  relates  to  the  domestic 
economy,  and  is affected  by  shifts  in external accounts  only  insofar as 
exports and imports vary. In that respect, it differs from the government 
budget,  which  is affected  as well  by changes  in world  prices and such 
3. See Vladimir  G. Treml  and Barry  L. Kostinsky  (1982,  pp. 19ff), Igor  Birman  (1981,  pp. 
60ff), and CIA  (1988). 
4. The expenditure item, "financing  external economic activities"  most likely includes 
much of the cost of administering  foreign  trade  and finance.  Such  costs properly  would 
be included among the outlays of the public sector budget. The wholesale prices at 
which exports  and imports  are to be valued in the public sector  budget supposedly  are 
the net of any turnover  taxes separately  recorded  among government  budget revenues. 
For  a prototype  of this budget, though without explicit  treatment  of foreign  economic 
activities,  see Bergson  (1953,  p. 20). 
5. Compounding  rather  than offsetting the gap between income and consumers'  goods 
supplies is a small  amount of household borrowing  from  banks.  Compare  Ofer,  Table  2. Macroeconomic  Issues  of Soviet  Reforms  *  337 
financial changes  as may occur without  the physical  volume  of exports 
or imports varying. 
Attention to this distinction  should forestall occasional misunderstand- 
ings. A significant factor in the mushrooming  government  budget deficit 
under Gorbachev, for example,  was the fall, in 1986, in the world price of 
oil, a major export.  At the inordinately  low  domestic  price, oil exports, 
rather than being  subsidized,  have consistently  yielded  a premium.  The 
collapse of world prices meant that the premium and with it government 
budget revenues  declined,  while per contra the government  budget defi- 
cit increased.  The inference  is sometimes  drawn  that the imbalance  in 
the consumers'  goods  market was correspondingly  exacerbated. In fact it 
was  exacerbated,  but  not  because  of  the  increase  in  the  government 
budget  deficit.  Rather that resulted  from the government's  response  to 
the  loss  of  hard currency  earnings;  to a degree  it curtailed imports  of 
consumers'  goods. 
In  contrast  to  the  government  budget,  the  public  sector  budget  is 
unaffected  by the fall in world oil prices. So far as imports are curtailed, 
however,  net exports  at domestic  prices do increase,  and with  that the 
public sector budget  does indeed  show an increased deficit, with a corre- 
sponding  adverse  effect in the macrobalance. 
As may be inferred from the illuminating  data on household  savings 
that Ofer has compiled  (Table 2), the public sector budget deficit, like the 
total  government  budget  deficit,  increased  under  Gorbachev, but  not 
nearly  as  much.  The  divergence  between  the  two  deficits  could  have 
originated variously, but a principal cause probably has been state enter- 
prise  accumulation  of  money  that  the  State Bank in  the  first instance 
advanced  to the government  to finance its deficit. Such enterprise hold- 
ings of money-for  the most part of the noncash  or bank deposit  sort- 
doubled  during  1986-89,  and now  exceed  100 billion rubles (FBIS, Sep- 
tember 28, 1989, p. 47). 
Under Soviet  planning  arrangements  bank deposits  are supposed  to 
be not nearly as fungible  as cash; but as Ofer indicates,  the distinction 
between  the  two  kinds  of  money  has  been  eroding  since  Gorbachev 
came to power.  To be at all complete,  any account of the macrobalance in 
the Soviet consumers'  goods  market must  consider  enterprise bank de- 
posits as well as household  cash holdings. 
As might be expected,  along with expansion  of the public sector defi- 
cit, there has  been  a marked increase  in the volume  of household  sav- 
ings,  relative to their disposable  income.  Ofer considers  that the rate of 
household  saving  is not  "grossly excessive"  by Western standards,  but 
he  nevertheless  concludes  that  repressed  inflation-a  more  or  less 
chronic  feature  in  the  Soviet  consumers'  goods  market-has  only  be- 
come more pronounced  under  Gorbachev. In view  of the egregariously 338 *  OFER 
disorganized  state of the Soviet  consumers'  goods  market, it would  be 
difficult to disagree.  True, there are reportedly  surpluses  of some  prod- 
ucts.  True also,  shortages  are feeding  on  themselves,  with  consumers 
stocking up on scarce goods  when  they can. But the shortages are by all 
accounts pervasive.  At prevailing  prices the aggregate of deficits in sup- 
plies doubtless  exceeds  the aggregate of surpluses.  In that rather conven- 
tional sense  the existence  of repressed  inflation seems  indisputable. 
The Soviet price structure, however,  is strange; just how strange is suf- 
ficiently evident  when  we consider a few facts cited by Ofer: sales taxes, 
mainly  on  manufactured  consumers  goods,  and  subsidies,  mainly  on 
food products and housing,  separately amount to some 12% of the GNP. 
With household  income  and consumers  goods  supplies  unchanged,  and 
prices at clearing levels,  there is, I think, a presumption  that households 
would  be spending  more and saving  less  than they now  do.  That, per- 
haps,  might  be  expected  for any  plausible  real interest  rate.  It seems 
particularly likely if the real interest rate remains negative,  as it is now.6 
This question  lends  itself to systematic  inquiry. (compare Leon Podkam- 
iner 1982, Irwin Collier, Jr. 1986). It will be illuminating to pursue further. 
Ofer's concluding  discussion  of the options  open for achieving macro- 
economic  balance as part of a program of economic  reform more gener- 
ally  strikes  me  as  quite  thoughtful  and  balanced.  His  critique  of  the 
program for stabilization  and reform that was adopted  at the December 
meeting  of the Congress  of Deputies  is also on target, and I have nothing 
to add to it here. 
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Comment 
MARTIN  L. WEITZMAN 
I believe  this paper by Gur Ofer does  an excellent job of going  over the 
basic  issues  of  the  current  Soviet  economic  dilemma.  All  the  correct 
ingredients  are present.  And,  in my opinion,  there is the right emphasis 
or balance-more  important  aspects  are treated centrally while  less  sig- 
nificant issues  are on the periphery. Where I might differ marginally is in 
nuances,  packaging,  and summing  up; that is, the ingredients  and pro- 
portions  would  be  more  or less  the  same,  but  I might  bake  the  cake 
slightly differently. 
It may be worthwhile  to begin by reviewing  briefly how  all this came 
about. While there are a few complicating  factors, essentially  the history 
of Soviet economic  growth  can be viewed  as one of the nicest and most 
relevant applications of the Solow growth model. Most applications are to 
steady state behavior,  since that is all most countries know. But in Soviet 
experience  we have  the kind of "natural experiment" talked about in all 
the texts on growth  theory. Very roughly, investment  rates were pushed 
up relatively rapidly from around zero to around 30% and held there for 
some  time.  This  produced  a huge  spurt of growth,  which  at the  time 
looked extremely high by comparison with any other time or place. How- 
ever, if one looked  closer at the sources of growth,  capital accumulation 
was doing  most  of the pushing.  The residual of total factor productivity 
was not very impressive  at all. So when  the capital got accumulated and 
the excess supplies  of labor got absorbed, the Soviet economy found itself 
in a position  of diminishing  returns growing at the labor force rate plus A, 
the rate of growth  of labor augmenting  technological  progress,  where  A 
was  very  low.  This is not  the  entire  story. If the  aggregate  production 
function  is to be Cobb-Douglas  then  A must  decline  over time,  while  a 
story with  constant  A requires an elasticity of substitution  of around  .4. 
There are some other nuances.  Still, in essence,  this is to my mind as neat 
and relevant an application  of the Solow growth model to economic  his- 
tory as has ever been  made. 
As  growth  rates systematically  decelerated  over the past  several  de- 
cades,  there  was  some  recognition  of the  nature of the basic problem. 
Soviet leaders have not proved themselves  to be great economists,  but it 
is remarkable to me how  well  they understood  the basic message  of the 
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Solow  growth  model  even  if they  did not at all know  the model  itself. 
The Soviet leadership  understood  well that they had to make a transition 
from "extensive"  to "intensive"  growth  and undertook  over the years a 
series of half-hearted  measures  aimed ultimately at increasing A. 
In March of 1985 a historical accident occurred. Gorbachev was elected 
first secretary. This man turned out to be a big-stakes gambler of the first 
order. Instead of opting  for slow  decline and gradual deterioration in all 
areas, he undertook  bold steps.  In the economic  sphere the situation has 
deteriorated since Gorbachev took office. 
The Soviet economy  today faces three monumental  problems,  any one 
of which  is potentially  devastating.  Taken together,  these three problem 
areas seem  to present  an almost insurmountable  barrier. 
The first major problem  concerns  what  is sometimes  euphemistically 
called macroeconomic  "fundamentals." This is a relatively recent, Gorba- 
chev-induced  situation.  Essentially there exists a substantial pent-up  de- 
mand at quasi-fixed prices. The situation is like an economy coming out of 
wartime price controls with far too much purchasing power in the hands 
of  the  population.  Even  if everything  else  were  fine  about  the  Soviet 
economy, this would represent a potentially explosive  situation calling for 
extreme stabilization measures.  I will return to this theme later because it 
is the most pressing  current economic  problem. 
The second  grave problem  is a structural reform of immense  magni- 
tude. Beneath all the fog, the Soviet Union is attempting to make a transi- 
tion from one entire economic  system  to another: from "some form of" a 
planned  system  to "some form of" a market system.  There are enormous 
headaches  in this area alone,  even if everything  else were fine. All the big 
issues of economics  are involved  on a massive scale: property, ownership, 
privatization,  banking,  credit,  capital  markets,  price reforms,  interna- 
tional trade, convertability, industrial organization,  taxation, unemploy- 
ment, inflation, bankruptcies,  and on and on. Somehow  the Soviets must 
build,  almost  from scratch,  what  Gur Ofer appropriately  calls a "mar- 
ketization infrastructure" in a society that has long been hostile to market 
ways.  The enormity  of this task is staggering. 
The third major problem is that there is no model for what the Soviets 
seem to be striving for-some  kind of "third way"-a  utopia that would 
somehow  combine  the best  features  of capitalism and socialism.  There 
is, to my reading,  no consistent  framework here, no clear articulation of 
feasible  goals.  Instead,  the  Soviet  leadership  seems  to  be  wandering 
around, improvising  as they go along, lurching from crisis to crisis. They 
seem unable to face up to hard choices,  to the apparent fact that market 
and plan may both work, but in between  them appears to be a wasteland 
of ambiguity.  Behind  all this  is a fundamental,  deeply  rooted  ambiva- 
lence about making a transition from socialism to capitalism. Soviet lead- 